In an unprecedented move, on 26 February 2026, Zimbabwe suspended the export of all raw minerals and lithium concentrates with immediate effect, pending further notice. The suspension also applied to minerals that were in transit for export.
The press statement issued by the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development emphasises the commitment to “ensuring transparency, in-country value addition and beneficiation, compliance, and accountability in the exportation of Zimbabwe’s mineral resources.”
The development came as a surprise to many, but it built on a series of legislative and regulatory measures introduced over the past few years that signalled the government’s growing intention to strengthen oversight of mineral exports and promote domestic value addition and beneficiation. Over the last few years, Zimbabwe has introduced several regulatory instruments to curb the under-declaration of lithium exports and further support beneficiation objectives.
In 2022, Statutory Instrument 213 was introduced to restrict the export of lithium-bearing ores and unbeneficiated lithium, permitting exports only under limited exceptions granted by the Minister, such as for sample shipments or under exceptional circumstances. This approach was reinforced through Statutory Instrument 5 of 2023, which extended similar restrictions to the export of unbeneficiated base minerals. Additional amendments introduced through Statutory Instrument 57 of 2023 further strengthened controls over the export of unbeneficiated lithium.
Another key legislative development occurred in 2025 with the adoption of Finance Act No. 7 of 2025, which introduced amendments to the Value Added Tax Act [Chapter 23:12]. The amendment established a differentiated tax regime for lithium exports to incentivise higher levels of processing and introduced a three-tier tax on the export of unbeneficiated lithium. The export of lithium ore and lithium concentrates is subject to a 10% tax on the gross fair market value, whilst export of lithium sulphate, a more processed form of lithium, attracts no export tax. These amendments came into effect in January 2026.
The broad fiscal scope highlights that lithium mining also attracts several taxes, including mining royalties and value-added taxes. The lithium mining sector also benefits from several tax incentives and concessions, such as a VAT deferment facility for the importation of high-value equipment and a customs duty rebate for capital equipment imported by the mining sector.
The Ministry of Mines and Mining Development made a sound argument that invoking a ban and forgoing the 10% export on unbeneficiated lithium as per the enacted Finance Act of 2025 was inevitable in light of increased smuggling, under declaration, and increased production as companies wanted to export raw lithium as much as possible before the 2027 deadline. Therefore, addressing these challenges presents an opportunity for the government to increase revenue, as all companies will be subject to the 10% export tax on lithium concentrates under the Finance Act (No. 7 of 2025). Furthermore, through the ban, the government also sent a policy signal that it intends to push for further value addition and beneficiation beyond lithium concentrates and to ensure that mining companies account for other minerals found within lithium and pay royalties on these minerals. These minerals include Tantalum, Cesium, Rare Earth Elements and Beryllium among others.
Taken together, these policy and legislative measures demonstrate that Zimbabwe’s recent export ban forms part of a broader policy trajectory aimed at promoting in-country value addition and ensuring greater national benefit from the country’s mineral resources.
The New Wave of Mineral Export Bans in Africa
Zimbabwe’s policy position resonates with broader resource sovereignty strategies emerging across Africa with about 13 countries now having instilled some ban on their minerals. For instance, Botswana adopted a firm stance in negotiating its mineral rights and has stood firm on the market principle of “buyers go to sellers”. Botswana informed the United States that any official business regarding Botswana’s natural resources should take place in Botswana ; and has also made a gradual shift from rough-diamond exports to domestic cutting, polishing, and aggregation.
Notably, Malawi has adopted a similar policy direction. In October 2025, the government introduced a ban on the export of all raw, unprocessed minerals, a measure reinforced in February 2026 alongside the suspension of new mining licenses. The policy previously applied to gold and has been maintained across administrations to compel local value addition, increase government revenue, and promote job creation within the domestic economy. The restrictions currently apply to key strategic minerals, including uranium, rare earth elements, graphite, and gemstones.
Zambia has also taken a firm stance in safeguarding control over its mineral resources. A proposed Zambia-US bilateral health deal, which was due to be signed last December, has since faltered because the US committed to provide funding in exchange for “collaboration in the mining sector and clear business sector reforms that will drive economic growth and commercial investment that benefit both the United States and Zambia.” This reflects growing caution among African governments regarding agreements that link development finance to preferential access to strategic mineral resources. This trend indicates a growing shift across African mineral-producing countries toward asserting greater control over their mineral value chains and ensuring that extraction translates into tangible domestic economic benefits.
Alignment with the Regional Agenda
On paper, these national policies closely align with regional and continental policy frameworks that have long advocated mineral beneficiation and industrialisation. The SADC Mining Vision and the Africa Mining Vision (AMV), adopted by African Union Heads of State in 2009, call for the transformation of Africa’s mineral resources into a catalyst for broad-based development. Central to the AMV is the promotion of downstream value addition, local beneficiation, and the development of mineral-based industrialisation to move African economies beyond the export of raw commodities.
Further to the AMV, the AU adopted the Green Minerals Strategy in response to the global energy transition. The strategy emphasises the need for African countries to move up the value chain in critical minerals. It highlights beneficiation, regional value chains, and domestic processing capacity as essential to ensuring that the energy transition supports industrial development across the continent rather than reproducing historical extractive patterns.
Recent discussions at the Mining Indaba have also echoed these priorities. Across panels and ministerial dialogues, there was a strong emphasis on the need for African countries to strengthen domestic processing, increase local content, and capture more value from the extraction of critical minerals essential to the global energy transition.
In his keynote, Zambia’s president, H.E. Hakainde Hichilema, called for partnerships that align stakeholders around long-term value creation. In this context, export restrictions on unprocessed minerals appear to be a logical policy instrument to encourage domestic beneficiation and create space for governments to develop the infrastructure and regulatory frameworks necessary to support local processing industries.
From Policy to Practice: Key Risks and Considerations
While the suspension of raw lithium exports represents a significant step towards promoting domestic beneficiation, export bans alone do not automatically translate into successful beneficiation strategies. For such policies to succeed, governments must accompany them with clear implementation of roadmaps, timelines, and investment frameworks that outline how beneficiation will be achieved in practice.
It is important to consider the need for policy coherence between mining law, investment policy, and tax policy. Historically, tax incentives and special economic zones have been used to attract investment. However, these can be avenues for trade-related illicit financial flows through trade mis-invoicing, profit shifting, abuse of tax incentives and weak customs monitoring. TJNA’s Anti-IFFs Policy Tracker pilots show that harmful tax incentives and weak transparency around investment regimes remain a major vulnerability across many African countries.
The engagements that Zimbabwe Environmental Law Organisation (ZELO) had with the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, the parliament, and the Minerals Marketing Corporation (MMCZ) since the implementation of the ban point to the need for the Government to provide fiscal incentives for companies to set up value addition and beneficiation plans. The government can explore the role of tax incentives in stimulating the lithium mining sector. However, policymakers must consider how to ensure that these tax incentives are informed by a cost-benefit analysis and designed to enable companies to move up the value chain while, at the same time, insulating the government from potential revenue loss.
The justification for careful consideration of awarding tax incentives is that tax incentives can only work when preconditions and non-tax incentives for value addition and beneficiation have been met. These preconditions and non-tax incentives include an assessment of the extent to which the government can create domestic demand for final end products, the level of mineral endowments, access to technology, commercial viability of mineral processing and the significance of the government’s contribution to the global mineral supply, access to energy, water, financing, policy clarity and consistency, among others.
The current discussion on the ban in Zimbabwe does not adequately address how these preconditions are key to determining whether one has a comparative advantage in moving up the value-addition and beneficiation value chain to begin with. Engagement with investors, civil society, communities, and regional partners is also essential to ensure that policies are credible, coordinated, and sustainable. At present, several recent export bans have been announced without detailed public information about the next steps.
This has created uncertainty among both communities and investors. As one observer recently enquired, “What does it mean when Zimbabwe says it will no longer export lithium or raw minerals? Will processing plants be built locally?” These are legitimate questions raised across the sector.
Export restrictions should be understood as a transitional policy tool, rather than an end in themselves and accompanied by concrete plans that clearly allocate responsibilities across government agencies, define investment requirements, and establish realistic timelines for building domestic processing capacity.
Without such clarity, export bans can create unintended risks. They may increase the likelihood of disputes with investors who already have mining agreements and infrastructure in place. They may also create conditions that encourage informal or illicit exports as companies attempt to recover costs under uncertain regulatory environments. In the absence of transparency and oversight, such situations could inadvertently create opportunities for corruption or illicit financial flows.
In Zimbabwe, for example, charging 10% export tax on lithium concentrates and mandating companies to move further up the value chain from concentrates to sulphates and extracting other minerals found in lithium (such as Tantalum and Beryllium) and subjecting them to royalty taxation, sounds very good from a domestic resource mobilisation (DRM) perspective. However, as long as the government does not address tax risks and other preconditions for value addition and beneficiation, such as access to water, electricity, skills development, and technological transfer, there is a risk that companies will capitalise on existing tax loopholes to evade taxes.
Finally, for beneficiation strategies to succeed, regional integration will be essential. Mineral value addition and processing often require significant infrastructure, technology, energy supply, and capital investment that may be difficult for a single country to mobilise on its own. As recognised in the Africa Mining Vision, the development of regional mineral value chains is critical to enabling African countries to collectively move up the mineral value chain.
Regional collaboration can allow countries to specialise across different stages of production, such as extraction, refining, manufacturing, and downstream processing, while benefiting from shared infrastructure, larger markets, and coordinated industrial policies. Without such regional coordination, national export bans risk fragmenting markets and limiting the economic viability of beneficiation efforts.
The authors of this blog are Ms. Gloria Majiga and Ms. Zandile Ndebele, of Tax Justice Network Africa (TJNA) and Mr. Tafara Chiremba of Zimbabwe Environmental Law Organization (ZELO)
For more information, please contact Ms. Zandile Ndebele via zndebele[@]taxjusticeafrica.net
